Reform coalitions and regime type: A theory of electoral change with application to Ecuador

Abstract

Throughout its history, Ecuador's electoral system has been subject to constant review,
especially during the democratic era. Although much has been written about these changes,
existing theory does not provide a coherent framework for reforms. In this article, I explain
electoral change as a function of different types of reformist coalitions conditioned by the
type of regime. According to the academic literature, under authoritarianism elites sought
electoral changes to maximize their power or minimize their potential electoral losses
in the face of extra-systemic challenges through protective reforms. However, under
democracy, political fragmentation and weak institutionalization of the party system have
made parties less able to maximize their long-term interests, meaning that the reform has
assumed a bottom-up realigning nature. I assess this coalition theory by reconstructing
the processes behind seven key moments of electoral reform: 1830, 1861, 1929, 1947,
1979, 1997, and 2020.